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Abstract
The immense power disparity between the legal community and interpreting 
community, the former continuously subjugating the latter, is often said to be the 
result of the judicial authority exercising their power to maintain their superiority 
as the only interpreter of language in a court of law, i.e., as the interpreter of law, the 
supreme rules that govern society through the means of language. The way their 
power is exercised upon foreign language interpreters, however, is actually much 
more complex. By applying Ian Mason’s (2015) “three types of power” that come 
into play in interpreter-mediated discourse and Steven Lukes’(2005) “three power 
dimensions,” this paper analyzes two most recent U.S. Supreme court cases that 
involved foreign language interpreters. One was Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific, 2012, a 
case of a former Japanese professional baseball player who was injured in Saipan, 
in which the Court determined whether interpreters and translators are the same or 
different, and the other was Aifang Ye v. U.S., a case of a Chinese woman convicted 
also in Saipan of alleged passport forgery but who questioned whether or not 
interpreter-mediated police interview statements would become hearsay without 
the police interpreter’s in-court testimony and cross-examination, the certiorari of 
which, however, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 13, 2016. By comparing 
how the U.S. Supreme Court treated the two interpreter-related issues, as well as 
how the interpreting professionals responded to these two issues, the paper 
demonstrates how the judicial power and authority continue to subjugate the 
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interpreting community, not just by direct coercion, but also through more subtle 
and indirect means, which continues to work successfully but also with a social 
cost, such as continuous silent violation of non-English-speaking criminal 
defendants’ due process rights by the Court’s perpetual silence on the hearsay 
issue of interpreter-mediated police interviews. 
1. Introduction: Power Disparity between Lawyers and Interpreters
Despite the fact that court interpreters in U.S. courts are full-fledged “officers of the 
court” (Administrative Office, 2020, p. 22), their professional status and position are, 
more often than not, portrayed as continuously placed at a substandard level compared 
to other professional players in the judicial system such as judges and other lawyers who 
often behave as if these interpreters were not visibly existent as full members (Pym, 1999, 
p. 280).
Legal professionals consider themselves specifically and exclusively qualified to act 
as interpreters of law, the supreme rules that govern and bind social and human activities 
by and only through the means of language, whether it is explicitly written in statues or 
case laws. Thus, foreign language interpreters, though conventionally called interpreters, are 
repeatedly reminded not to interpret but just to translate, word for word, what a foreign-lan-
guage-speaker has stated (Morris, 1995, p. 32), no matter how oxymoronic this may 
sound.
The same is true not only of ordinary court interpreters. Other judicial interpreters, 
such as police interpreters or asylum/immigration court interpreters have also been expe-
riencing the same or even worse predicament, regularly regarded as expendable ad hoc 
interpreters procured at low costs (Mason, 2015, p. 315), a situation which also means no 
quality assurance for the most vulnerable users of their services, e.g., witnesses of minor 
languages (González, Vásquez, & Mikkelson, 2012, pp. 295-296). This seems to be the last-
ing situation with no signs of improvement ever seeming to appear on the horizon.
Even the legal definition of the role of an interpreter continuously stays in the gray 
zone, as U.S. courts perpetually remain unresolved as to whether an interpreter is an 
agent (a legal representative of the user of the interpreting service such as a suspect in a 
police interview, even when no explicit legal authorization was given to the interpreter 
by the service user or the suspect), or a conduit (a factually existing extra linguistic layer 
fictitiously deemed as non-existent for judicial expediency), or a completely indepen-
dent declarant (a speaker actually making her/his own original statements under the dis-
guise of translation of the statement made by the user of the interpreting service), thus 
never giving an answer to the 200-year-old pending question as to whether or not 
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interpreter-mediated police interview statements become hearsay without the police in-
terpreter’s in-court testimony (Tamura, 2019; Bolitho, 2019).
The fundamental reason for this is of course the immense institutional power dis-
parity between the legal community and the interpreting community, with the former 
subjugating the latter in a direct coercive manner commanding the latter with a long list 
of norms to be obeyed. However, the power disparity between the judicial community 
and the interpreting community, this paper argues, is also a result of a more complex 
power exercise by the judicial authority, the highest of which in the U.S. is the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
By applying Ian Mason’s (2015) “three types of power” that come into play in inter-
preter-mediated discourse and Steven Lukes’ (2005) “three power dimensions,” this paper 
analyzes two most recent U.S. Supreme court cases on language interpreters. One was 
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific, 2012, a case of a former Japanese professional baseball player who 
was injured in Saipan, in which the Court determined whether interpreters and translators 
are the same or different, and the other was Aifang Ye v. U.S., a case of a Chinese woman 
convicted also in Saipan of alleged passport forgery but who questioned whether or not 
interpreter-mediated police interview statements would become hearsay without the po-
lice interpreter’s in-court testimony and cross-examination, the certiorari of which, how-
ever, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 13, 2016. This paper demonstrates how 
the judicial power and authority in the U.S. continue to subjugate the interpreting com-
munity, indirectly and astutely, but also decisively and successfully, though with an in-
evitable social cost.  
2. Analytical Framework: Power and Control by Mason (2015) and Lukes (2005)
2.1 Mason’s Three Types Power That Come into Play in Interpreter-Mediated Discourse
Interpreting is a “socially situated activity,” involving “power and control” (Mason, 2015, 
p. 314) exercised by multiple parties, each coming with different, often conflicting, goals 
and interests, a most typical example of which would be judicial interpreting, where the 
ultimate goal of the adversarial discourse is to decide the winner and the loser. Mason 
(2015) notes three types of power constantly at play in interpreter-mediated discourse: 1) 
power relations between languages; 2) institutionally pre-determined power disparities; 
and 3) interpreters’ interactional power advantage (pp. 314-316). 
Typically, those requiring interpreters in judicial procedures are witnesses who do 
not speak the language of the majority, which in “colonial times” was the language of the 
“conquers” and in the “current hegemony” is English as a lingua franca (Mason, 2015, 
p. 314), the language of international business and politics. Being unable to use the 
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majority’s language, therefore, is associated with the socially low status of the uneducat-
ed, and the language they speak is also looked down upon. The interpreters for these mi-
nor languages often come from the same linguistic and cultural group as heritage 
speakers, so the speakers of the majority’s language may also look down on these inter-
preters with similarly low respect.
Such interpreters may also be put into a similar category as what Cronin (2002) re-
ferred to as “heteronomous” (p. 393), those who belong to the other side and thus inher-
ently unreliable. Also, interpreters, reliable or unreliable, come with interactional power 
advantage, being the only bilingual person who can steer the discourse (Mason, 2015, 
pp. 315-316), another reason why judges, lawyers, or law-enforcement officers may try to 
reinforce their rein using their “institutional power” (Mason, 2015, p. 315). The perpetual 
mantra commanding not to interpret but translate word-for-word as a language conduit is one 
of the most problematic examples of such institutional power execution by the judicial 
authority, which the interpreting community has repeatedly criticized but nonetheless 
has persisted (Morris, 1995, p. 32). 
2.2 Steven Lukes’ Three Power Dimensions
The interplay of power and conflict in interpreting has often been analyzed using such 
theories as those by Steven Lukes (2005), Michel Foucault (e.g. 1997), or Pierre Bourdieu 
(e.g. Bourdieu, 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) (Strowe, 2016, p. 120). For example, 
Baker (2006) referred to Lukes (2005) in her analysis of translation issues in military con-
flict, and Inghilleri (2003, 2005) employed Bourdieu’s idea of “habitus” (Bourdieu, 1991; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) for interpreter-mediated asylum court proceedings. 
In addition to Mason’s three types of power, this paper also draws on Lukes’ three 
power dimensions (2005), which are three ways through which X exercises power over Y: 
1) X exercises power to force Y to make decisions contrary to Y’s interest; 2) X exercises 
power to pre-empt potential conflict that may arise between X and Y; and 3) X exercises 
power to influence Y’s wishes and desires, so Y will wish for what may be against Y’s in-
terest. This paper applies Luke’s second and third power dimensions in the analysis of 
the interpreter-related U.S. Supreme Court cases mentioned above to demonstrate how 
the judicial power is exerted upon the interpreting community in order for the former to 
maintain the latter under firm control. 
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3. Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific (2012): Background of the Story
3.1 U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear a Japanese Baseball Player’s Case
Every year, nearly 10,000 cases are appealed to the United States Supreme Court, of 
which the Court hears and decides barely one percent (Epstein and Walker, 2011, p. 14). 
In light of this lottery-like probability, as to why Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific (2012), a seem-
ingly trifle civil suit between Koichi Taniguchi, a Japanese citizen and a former profes-
sional baseball player, and a resort hotel in Saipan, on a small dispute involving only a 
little over $5,000 for the cost of a court interpreter, ever caught the attention of the 
Supreme Court justices, therefore, was a big mystery to the author at first. As a Japanese 
citizen and an interpreter trainer, the author was strongly compelled to find out how this 
case ever managed to find its way from a remote, Western Pacific island all the way up to 
the nine justices in a high seat of the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.
3.2 Legal Question: Are Interpreters and Translators the Same or Different?
The story began on November 6, 2006, when the petitioner, Taniguchi, a former Japanese 
professional baseball player, got injured when his leg fell through a broken wooden deck 
on the property of the Mariana Resort and Spa in Saipan, a hotel run by Kan Pacific, the 
respondent. On February 11, 2008, Taniguchi filed a suit against the hotel in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, alleging that the resulting injuries 
caused large medical expenses and also incapacitated him from assuming contractual du-
ties (Taniguchi, pp. 562-563)
The district court, in its summary judgment, ruled in favor of Kan Pacific on the 
ground that Taniguchi had failed to prove that Kan Pacific had knowingly neglected the 
care of the defective deck. The court then ordered Taniguchi to pay Kan Pacific $5,517.20 
for their “interpreter cost,” out of which only $260 was the actual cost Kan Pacific had 
paid to their interpreter, with the remaining $5,257.20 paid to the translator of the docu-
ments Kan Pacific used for this litigation. This cost taxation was based on 28 U.S. Code 
§1920(6), which allows the district court judge or clerk to order the losing party to pay 
the prevailing party’s “cost of interpreters” (Taniguchi, p. 563). The provision stipulates as 
follows.
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
 (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
 (2)  Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained 
for use in the case;
 (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
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 (4)  Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials 
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
 (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
 (6)  Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, 
and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services un-
der section 1828 of this title. 
 (underlined by the author)
The item (6) above was added to the preceding five items in 1978, when Congress 
passed the Court Interpreters Act (Taniguchi, p. 562) for the purpose of facilitating the use 
of more qualified court interpreters by introducing a certification system. Unfortunately, 
however, the Court Interpreters Act itself did not define the word “interpreter” (Taniguchi, 
p. 566). Taniguchi appealed, arguing that 28 U.S. Code §1920(6) only covers the cost of 
“interpreters for spoken speech,” not “translators of written documents.” The Ninth 
Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s cost taxation, ruling that 28 U.S. Code 
§1920(6) also covers “document translation,” not just oral interpreting of live speech in 
court (Taniguchi, p. 563)
On September 27, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ, to answer the ques-
tion as to whether 28 U.S.C. §1920(6), which awards the prevailing party “compensation 
of interpreters,” also covers the cost of “document translation” (Taniguchi, pp. 563-564). 
Thus, the nine justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, then still including the 
late Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the late Antonin Scalia, decided to hear the case of a 
Japanese baseball player, for the purpose of determining whether interpreting and transla-
tion are the same or not.
4. Translation v. Interpretation: Interpreting Studies and Interpreting Practice
In the discipline of translation and interpreting studies, is the distinction between transla-
tion and interpretation always unambiguously clear? Generally, what Pöchhacker (2016) 
stated at the outset of the book’s first chapter that “interpreting” is a “translational activi-
ty” which should be written with a capital letter “T” as “Translation” to denote its “generic, 
hypernymic sense” (p. 9) is more or less the common understanding in this academic 
field. In other words, in the field of translation and interpreting studies, the generic word 
“Translation” is used to refer to both subfields: translation and interpreting.
What would then distinguish interpreting and translation with a small letter “t”? 
Surprisingly, the first feature Pöchhacker (2016) mentions is not “oral vs. spoken,” as that 
would exclude sign language interpreting (p. 10). Instead, the initial distinctive feature is 
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“immediacy” for “immediate use” in “real-time communication” (pp. 10-11). Traditionally, 
therefore, interpreting has always been associated with ephemeral communicative activi-
ty the product of which was very difficult to preserve perhaps until the invention of an 
audio-recorder, whereas even an ancient-day translation, if preserved physically, has re-
mained till today and can be studied for scholastic analyses.
In real practice, however, the distinction becomes more blurred. For instance, inter-
preters engage in what is called sight-translation, an immediate oral translation of a writ-
ten text. As another example, broadcast interpreters, e.g., those in Japan, have commonly 
practiced what is known as jisa-tsūyaku or voice-over interpreting with a pre-translated 
text (Ino & Kawahara, 2008). Also, court interpreters in many countries are often given a 
text in advance, e.g., an indictment, an opening statement, or even a sentence, which they 
translate beforehand and read aloud simultaneously to the defendant by using a wireless 
system (Nagao and Watanabe, 1998, pp. 179-201; Tsuda, Sano, Asano, & Nukada, 2016, 
pp. 92-93, p. 97). 
In U.S. courts, too, document translation has become a “core job function of the 
court interpreter” especially since the enactment of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
that ensures the production of translated documents for trials to protect the rights of lan-
guage minorities (González, Vásquez, & Mikkelson, 2012, p. 907), which is evinced, for 
example, by the standard procedural guidelines for court interpreter services of the state 
of Massachusetts, which clearly include productions of written translations as a part of 
court interpreters’ work (Committee, 2009, p. 8, pp. 14-15). 
In addition, depending on what kind of terminology is available in each language 
to refer to the actual activities, the distinction between interpreting and translation be-
comes even more vague. The Japanese language fortunately has two distinct terms, one 
of which is tsūyaku that refers to interpreting, while the other, honyaku, refers to written 
translation. However, in English, it is not uncommon to use the verb translate just to refer 
to the act of providing a rendition from the SL (Source Language) to the TL (Target 
Language). Thus, an interpreter saying something like ‘I should have translated it differ-
ently’ would mean ‘I should have used a different expression to render the meaning of 
the SL into the TL in my interpreting (oral translation),’ though it is also possible to say ‘I 
should have interpreted it differently.’ Here, however, the statement ‘I should have inter-
preted it differently’ may have a slightly different nuance or meaning as the verb interpret 
also means to understand something to have a particular meaning. Thus, ‘I should have inter-
preted it differently,’ could also mean ‘I should have understood the SL to mean some-
thing different from how I understood it and rendered it into the TL.’
Similarly, those who are not so familiar with the fine terminological distinctions 
may commonly say something like ‘I don’t speak Japanese, so I need a translator to come 
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with me,’ meaning ‘I need an interpreter who can speak my language.’ Thus, it seems 
rather common to observe people using a translator to denote an interpreter, though the 
author has never heard the other way; i.e., people using the term an interpreter to refer to 
a translator of a written text, although as has been mentioned, interpreters are actually ex-
pected to, or due to circumstances often forced to do written document translation as a part 
of their interpreting work.
5. Translation vs. Interpretation: Lawyers’ Debate
In preparation for the oral argument scheduled for February 21, 2012, briefs were submit-
ted by both sides, Taniguchi, the petitioner, arguing that “interpreters” do not include 
“translators of a written text,” and Kan Pacific, the respondent, arguing that they do. Both 
parties presented arguments basically in the following three areas: A) ordinary meaning 
according to dictionary definitions; B) actual practice in the two professions; and C) harm 
or benefits of including translation costs in interpreter costs; which are explained below.
A. Ordinary Meaning: Dictionary Definitions and Ordinary Usage
Ordinary meaning is a legal term. As has been mentioned in Section 1 above, legal profes-
sionals consider themselves specifically and exclusively qualified to act as interpreters of 
law, the most authoritative of whom in the U.S. are the nine justices of the Supreme 
Court, who are endowed with the ultimate prerogative to interpret and define the law of 
the land. As to how this is done, however, is in the realm of legal methods (Epstein and 
Walker, 2011, p. 23) on which these justices commonly and often vehemently disagree 
with one another.
For example, in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, some of the common methods 
used by the Supreme Court justices are: 1) original intent, which asks what the framers, or 
those who drafted the Constitution in 1787, wanted to do; 2) textualism, which simply fo-
cuses on what the Constitution textually says; 3) original meaning, which looks at what a 
clause meant or was understood by those who enacted it; or 4) stare decisis, a Latin term 
which means ‘let the decisions stand,’ and which tries to draw on the Court’s previously 
made decisions, or precedents; in addition to others (Epstein and Walker, 2011, p. 25).
In the case of Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific (2012), since the Court Interpreters Act of 1978 
did not define the word “interpreter” at the time of its enactment, and no other relevant 
statutory provisions define “interpreter” (Taniguchi, p. 566), the method expected to be 
used by the Supreme Court was ordinary meaning, based on stare decisis; i.e., a method 
used in one of the Court’s precedents, Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer (1995). Here, the 
Supreme Court tried to determine if the two verbs “to market” and “to sell” had the same 
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meaning or not, by exploring its ordinary use and also by referring to major dictionaries, 
such as The Oxford universal dictionary (Murray, Little, & Onions, 1955) or Webster’s new in-
ternational dictionary (Neilson and Knott, 1935).
B. Whether or Not the Two Terms are Distinguished in Professional Practice 
Both parties argued whether or not the two occupations or jobs were clearly distinguished 
in actual assignments in courts or in the interpreting industry. Taniguchi, the petitioner, 
was supported by two amici briefs, or opinion statements by those with “a strong interest 
in the subject matter” (Garner, 2009, p. 263), from interpreting and translation profession-
als, together also citing close to eighty authorities in the field of interpreting and transla-
tion studies, in addition to numerous relevant legal precedents. Kan Pacific, the 
respondent, emphasized how blurred the distinction frequently becomes in the actual 
court interpreting practice, also citing more than thirty authorities in the field, some over-
lapping with those cited by Taniguchi, in addition to similarly numerous legal precedents.
C. Harm of Cost Taxation vs. Harm of Ending the Current Cost Taxation 
Both parties explicated the harm in continuing or discontinuing the current cost taxation 
system. Major issues were: 1) amount of translation costs, especially of discovery docu-
ments, and 2) potential harm on prevailing litigants who still will have to pay the transla-
tion costs.
As an additional note on awarding costs, in the United States, the basic “American 
Rule” is that each party generally bears responsibility for its own litigation costs such as 
expenses for attorneys, experts, consultants, or investigators (Taniguchi, P. 573), except for 
what the court taxed the other party based on 28 U.S. Code §1920 mentioned in Section 3.2 
above, unlike in the U.K., where “the loser pays” for “the prevailing party’s litigation-re-
lated fees and expenses,” presumably to encourage “fairness and efficiency” and to dis-
courage “frivolous lawsuits” (Overfield, 2013, p. 218; Kritzer, 2005). 
5.1  Arguments by Taniguchi, the Petitioner: Interpreters Do Not Include Translators
Taniguchi’s major arguments contending that “cost of interpreters” do not include “trans-
lators” were as follows.
A. Ordinary Meaning: Dictionary Definitions and Ordinary Usage
A predominant number of authoritative dictionaries, of which 10 were cited, not only de-
fined an “interpreter” as one who translates “orally,” but some even specially mentioned 
that the usage of “interpreter” to refer to “one who translates a written text” is “obsolete,” 
e.g., The Chambers dictionary (2006) and The Oxford English dictionary (Simpson & Weiner, 
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1989) (Brief for petitioner, 2012, p. 14). Also, professional literature (e.g. González, 
Vásquez, & Mikkelson, 2012; de Jongh, 1992) makes a clear distinction between “transla-
tion” as written and “interpretation” as spoken, while noting that the former also generi-
cally refers to both, so “interpretation” is a “proper subset limited to the spoken mode” 
(Brief for petitioner, 2012, pp. 12-13). 
B. Two Amici Briefs from Professional Community: Clear Distinction between the Two
Two amici briefs were also submitted from the professional community to support the 
distinction between interpreters and translators: one from the National Association of 
Judiciary Interpreters and Translators, and the other from interpreting and translation 
professors.
The former, commonly called the NAJIT is a nationwide organization of judicial in-
terpreters and translators in the U.S. founded in 1978, in the same year as the establish-
ment of the Court Interpreters Act in the U.S., to ensure quality services, due process, 
equal protection, and equal access, covering, as of 2012, more than 1,200 languages in-
cluding American Sign Language. (Brief of the National Association, 2012, p. 1). 
Noting that “interpreters speak while translators write” as the most basic distinc-
tion, the 24-page-long NAJIT brief explained how the two professions are distinguished: 1) 
different skills required for certification tests as well as for the actual work; 2) Congress, 
the Executive, and the Courts consistently distinguish the two; 3) unlike interpreter fees 
that are restricted to the actual time served, e.g., the trial time, translation expenses are 
unpredictable and outside the reach of judicial supervision; and thus, 4) awarding trans-
lation costs, or making the losing party pay the translation costs of the winning party, 
imposes an extra burden on district courts as they would have to check whether the costs 
were “necessarily incurred,” by inspecting each submitted proof (Brief of the National 
Association, 2012, pp. 5-23).
The other brief was submitted by a group of eight professors of interpreting and 
translation studies across the U.S.: R. Brecht and J. Danks of the University of Maryland 
Center for Advanced Study of Language; F. Massardier-Kennedy, K. Washbourne, and S. 
E. Wright of Kent State University; D. W. Massaro of the University of California, Santa 
Cruz; H. Mikkelson and B. S. Olsen of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at 
Monterey; all of whom collectively explicated a clear distinction both from empirical and 
practical standpoints, referring to Gile (2011, p. 52) that two are “even incompatible pro-
fessions” (Brief of amici curiae, 2012, p. 6). 
In the 38-page-long amici, they argued that: 1) while dictionary definitions are use-
ful, the Court should consider how the two occupations are clearly distinguished in the 
industry; 2) different skills apply to each work, with sight translation, i.e., oral translation 
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of a written text, clearly a part of interpreters’ work; 3) each goes through different train-
ing, and as for court interpreters, they must also pass a “rigorous” federal certification ex-
amination and a similar examination for states, while for translators no such federal or 
state certification examinations exist; and 4) the types of researches conducted are also 
different between the two disciplines (Brief of amici curiae, 2012, pp. 7-37).
C. Risk of Awarding Large Translation Costs: Not Sensible as a Policy Matter
Allowing translation costs to be taxed on the losing party may lead to an unreasonably 
large amount, because unlike interpreting work limited to the trial time only, the amount 
of necessary translation could become limitless. In addition, translation expenses for civil 
litigations, e.g., translation of discovery documents, have been rising recently; e.g., one 
federal court awarded $1,000,000 in document translation in 2009 (Brief for petitioner, 
2012, pp. 37-39), and this cost-awarding practice in U.S. courts for discovery documents is 
now creating concern overseas regarding their citizens getting involved in such huge cost 
burdens (Brief for petitioner, p. 40). 
5.2 Arguments by Kan Pacific, the Respondent: Interpreters Include Translators
Kan Pacific’s major responses to Taniguchi were as follows.
A. Ordinary Meaning: Dictionary Definitions and Ordinary Usage
Black’s law dictionary (Black’s, 1957; Garner, 2009) and Webster’s third new international dic-
tionary (Gove, 1976) both define “interpreter” as “a person who translates from one lan-
guage to another,” and then only adds with a sense divider “; esp.” that it also “especially” 
refers to a person who “translates orally” (Brief for respondent, 2012, pp. 6-7), denoting 
that the general definition is “a person who translates,” to which “especially, orally” is 
subsumed. Also, judges across the nation who regularly use interpreters as well as the 
Supreme Court justices themselves have referred to those who translate written language 
as “interpreters” (Brief for respondent, pp. 12-17).
B. Conventional Practice Inconvenienced and Immigrants Harmed by the New Change
Translated documentary evidence is as important as orally translated testimonial evi-
dence, and court interpreters have long been engaged in document translation tasks on a 
regular basis such as: sight translation, i.e., oral translation of a written document; tran-
scription and translation of recorded oral conversations; and other similar document 
translation tasks (Brief for respondent, 2012, pp. 7-8). The change will especially harm 
immigrants and non-English speakers, who will no longer be able to recover the transla-
tion costs even if they prevail (Brief for respondent, pp. 31-32).
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With the above hybrid-type tasks that combine both spoken and written modes, the 
distinction seems to become even more blurred. For example, if Kan Pacific had had an 
interpreter sight-translate the written documents, i.e., contracts and medical records, in 
court instead of having them translated into written documents, would it have been com-
pletely taxable with no objections (Brief for respondent, p. 23)?
C. Risk of Awarding Large Translation Costs: Very Low & Judges Can Use Discretion
Taniguchi’s concern about potential large translation cost taxation is groundless. The ex-
ample of more than $1,000,000 was an extremely rare case. Among the cases cited by 
Taniguchi, only one awarded more than $76,000, and the rest were: 23 cases awarded less 
than $13,000; 16 cases awarded less than $3,000; and 8 awarded less than $1,000 (Brief for 
respondent, 2012, pp. 25-26). Insignificance of these costs can be evinced by the facts that 
no single amicus was filed from abroad for this case (Brief for respondent, p. 34)
More importantly, the wording of the provision 28 U.S. Code §1920(6) specifically 
says that a “judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs (underlined 
by the author),” meaning that the provision allows each judge to use discretion about 
awarding costs (Brief for respondent, p. 27) 
6. Supreme Court’s Split Judgment in Favor of Taniguchi (Petitioner)
6.1 Majority: Ordinary Meaning from Dictionaries & Narrower Scope for Taxable Costs
The majority (Alito, Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Kagan) ruled as follows. The 
statute in question, 28 U.S. Code §1920(6) “[c]ompensation of court appointed experts, 
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpreta-
tion services under section 1828 of this title” was added to the preceding five taxable cost 
items listed in this code, in 1978, when Congress passed the Court Interpreters Act for the 
purpose of facilitating the use of more qualified court interpreters by introducing a certi-
fication system. However, since the act itself did not define the word “interpreter,” the 
Supreme Court, based on a precedent, employed the method of defining the term based 
on its ordinary meaning, by determining the most common usage at the time of the statute’
s legislation in 1978 (Taniguchi, pp. 565-566), as was explained in Section 5-A above.
Both parties thus presented how most authoritative English language and legal dic-
tionaries defined “interpreter” in the editions that were available in 1978, at the time of 
the law’s enactment. Most of them defined the word “interpreter” as one who “orally 
translates spoken language.” Only one dictionary carried a gray-zone definition: Webster’s 
third new international dictionary (Gove, 1976), which defined “interpreter” as “one that 
translates; esp.: a person who translates orally for parties conversing in different tongues,” 
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with a sense divider “esp. (especially)” in the middle. Kan Pacific (respondent) argued that 
this sense divider indicated that the definition before “esp.” represented a more general, 
commonly used definition, including both “written and oral” (Taniguchi, pp. 567-568)
The Supreme Court ruled, however, that “that a definition is broad enough to en-
compass one sense of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily understood in 
that sense,” and concluded that this sense divider specifically denoted what came after it 
was the most common, ordinary usage (Taniguchi, p. 568). Furthermore, the Court also re-
ferred to The Oxford English dictionary (Simpson & Weiner, 1989), which specifically men-
tioned that the use of the word “interpreter” to mean a “translator of written documents” 
was “obsolete,” and noted that Oxford “[is] one of the most authoritative on the English 
language” (Taniguchi, p. 569). 
Thus, with the definition of “interpreter” clarified and determined, the Court then 
noted that this decision was made in order to remain within the “narrow scope of taxable 
costs” (Taniguchi, p. 573). The taxable cost items, the Court noted, should be “limited to rela-
tively minor, incidental expenses” such as “clerk fees, court reporter fees, expenses for print-
ing and witnesses, expenses for exemplification and copies, docket fees, and compensation 
of court-appointed experts,” the assessment of which is often a simple “clerical matter that 
can be done by the court clerk,” and is only a fraction compared to the “nontaxable expenses 
borne by litigants for attorneys, experts, consultants, and investigators” (Taniguchi, p. 573).
6.2 Dissent by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, & Breyer: Concern for Practical Implications
Ginsburg, joined by Sotomayor and Breyer, noted two issues of concern in her dissent: 1) 
awarding document translation costs had been a long-time practice in numerous district 
courts, which had also been affirmed by many appellate courts (Taniguchi, pp. 576-578); 
and 2) document translation was no less important than oral translation of testimonies 
for a fair and just trial, by equipping litigants to “present their cases clearly” and enabling 
non-English-speaking parties to “stand equal with others before the court,” and for the 
courts to “decide the merits intelligently” (Taniguchi, p. 579).
Furthermore, the practice of awarding the cost for document translation went even 
further back before 1978, “spanning several decades” since 1930’s, basing the taxation on 
codes which were predecessors of §1920 (Taniguchi, pp. 577-578). Also, the ruling based 
on Taniguchi would leave the interpreters’ hybrid task zones unclear, e.g.; 1) if an inter-
preter spends hours outside court to translate a written document to prepare for an in-
court sight translation task, the new Taniguchi ruling would only count the time used in 
court for the interpreter to orally read aloud the pre-translated document, without in-
cluding the preparation time; or 2) if an interpreter listens to a recorded foreign-language 
speech, transcribes it, and translates it into English, the Taniguchi ruling would categorize 
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it as translation as it gives the interpreter “the luxury of multiple playbacks of the tape 
and the leisure to consult extrinsic linguistic sources” (Taniguchi, p. 580).
7.  Power Differential: Legal Debate on Interpreters without Essential 
Interpreting Issues
7.1 Supreme Court’s Real Aim & Absence of Real Interpreting Issues
Both parties submitted arguments in order for the Supreme Court to decide whether in-
terpreters and translators are the same or not, primarily in three areas: A) ordinary mean-
ing according to dictionary definitions; B) actual practice in the two professions; and C) 
harm or benefits of including translation costs in interpreter costs.
As is evident from the Court’s majority ruling, the real aim of the Supreme Court or 
the most probable reason why the Court decided to hear this small civil suit taking place 
in a remote Pacific island, appealed by a former Japanese baseball player over a little 
more than $5,000 for the costs of an interpreter, was neither because the Court was inter-
ested in the work of interpreters or the fine technical differences between interpreters and 
translators, nor because the Court wanted to find out about the predicaments both of 
court interpreters tasked with additional written translation duties or non-English-speak-
ing litigants becoming hesitant about filing civil suits fearing a large amount of document 
translation costs they may have to pay even if they prevail. The only judges that were 
concerned about such practical matters that interpreters and non-English-speaking liti-
gants would have to face were those of the minority dissent: the late Ginsburg, joined by 
Sotomayor and Breyer. 
Rather, the real aim, as was noted in the last paragraph of Section 6.1 above, was 
most probably to make clear that the Supreme Court will stay within the “narrow scope 
of taxable costs” and will reject an expansive interpretation of such cost items as “clerk 
fees, court reporter fees, expenses for printing and witnesses, expenses for exemplifica-
tion and copies, docket fees, and compensation of court-appointed experts” (Taniguchi, p. 
573). In other words, the Court’s real aim most possibly was to place Taniguchi’s baseball 
cap on some of the rapidly increasing cost taxations, particularly those of “e-discovery 
(electronic discovery),” the costs for sorting out a huge amount of electronically stored 
data such as those in “email, hard drives, databases, and clouds” to present to the oppos-
ing party in litigations, the decision on which was becoming controversial with divided 
opinions among courts (Overfield, 2013, p. 217).  
Thus, in order for the Supreme Court to move forward with this agenda, this small 
civil dispute in Saipan involving an interpreter’s fee may have been chosen, after which 
the Court distinguished interpreters and translators, not by carefully examining the 
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nature and the content of each work or technical differences between the professions, but 
simply by determining the ordinary meaning of “interpreter” based on major dictionaries’ 
definitions, which, according to legal theories, was the adequate method of deciding a 
term’s definition. 
Though Taniguchi, the petitioner won the case, as to how much the Court was actually 
influenced or enlightened by all the voluminous amici briefs submitted by the NAJIT and 
the nation’s leading interpreting studies professors, explicating the fine technical details 
about the two professions, remains unknown. In addition, with this new distinction be-
tween interpreters and translators drawn by the Supreme Court, the trial judges’ traditional 
dictum to interpreters not to interpret but just to translate, word for word, what a foreign-lan-
guage-speaker has stated (Morris, 1995, p. 32) would seem to gain an additional oxymoronic 
dimension, but for these judges, foreign language interpreters’ interpretation will remain just 
oral translation, not the type of interpretation these judges exclusively engage in. 
This whole case, hence, has reminded the author of how Pym (1999, p. 280) de-
scribed the complete exclusion of interpreters by lawyers (the judge, the prosecutors, and 
the defense counsels), who, in their heated discussions on various English-Spanish inter-
preting issues, never sought or even thought of seeking advice directly from the inter-
preters who were right there on duty during the on-going sessions of O.J. Simpson’s trial. 
For them, interpreters may have been physically there but only as a translation device, 
not as professional members on an equal footing who could be consulted about how to 
interpret the meaning of a foreign language, because interpretation is a job that exclusively 
belongs to lawyers (Pym, 1999, p. 280).
7.2 Taniguchi Decision: Stark Contrast with Another, Long-Unresolved Interpreter Issue
Furthermore, the way the Supreme Court’s majority ruling very simply, singlehandedly, 
almost with a single stroke, made a decision on actually rather complex issues concerning 
the distinction between interpreting and translation, without going into any of the fine 
details of necessary skills or required tasks in real work, reminded the author of another 
interpreter-related legal issue in the U.S., which, in stark contrast with Taniguchi, contin-
ues to remain unresolved: the hearsay issue of interpreter-mediated police interviews. 
Thus, this paper next discusses how the police interpreter’s hearsay issue has been treat-
ed by the U.S. Supreme Court, comparing Taniguchi with another interpreter-related case 
that also took place in Saipan, U.S. v Aifang Ye (2015). Through a comparative analysis of 
how the Supreme Court has dealt with these two cases involving a foreign language in-
terpreter, by using Mason’s (2015) “three types of power” and Lukes’ (2005) “three power 
dimensions,” this paper delineates how the judicial authority’s power is continuously ex-
erted on foreign language interpreters. 
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8. U.S. v Aifang Ye (2015): Police Interpreter’s Hearsay Issue 
This is a case of a Chinese woman Ye, who was convicted of passport forgery in Saipan. 
In September, 2011, Ye and her husband, both Chinese citizens, travelled from China to 
Saipan on a tourist visa. Her husband soon returned to China but Ye, who was pregnant, 
overstayed her visa and gave birth to their second child in February, 2012, who was 
named Jessie and by the place of her birth became a U.S. citizen. Obtaining a passport for 
Jessie required both parents’ “in person” application at the passport office, or by one of 
them showing a notarized statement or affidavit by the other absent parent (U.S. v Aifang 
Ye, 2015, p. 398).
Ye and her husband wished to obtain a U.S. passport for Jessie, but her husband 
trying to get a notarized statement would draw attention at home in China to the birth of 
a second child, which they wanted to prevent. Upon obtaining advice from a local agent 
in Saipan, Kaiqi Lin, who was helping Ye’s document translation, Ye decided to have her 
husband’s brother travel from China to Saipan to accompany her to the passport office in 
Saipan, disguising as her husband (Ye, 2015, p. 398). The case only briefly explains that Ye 
and her husband did this because the new-born daughter was their second child, which 
they wanted to keep as private as possible (Ye, 2015, p. 398). The author notes that this 
may have been related to the fact that this baby was born in February, 2012, which was 
before China’s official abolition of the “One-Child Policy” that became effective only after 
January, 2016. Unfortunately for Ye, however, the DHS (Department of Homeland 
Security) had Lin “under their surveillance” and found that the passport of Ye’s “husband” 
was false. Ye was arrested (Ye, 2015, p. 398). 
Ye provided her statement to the DHS through a “Language Line” interpreter, 
which was not recorded. The U.S., just like Japan, is lagging rather behind other advanced 
countries in the introduction of mandatory electronic recording of police interviews, es-
pecially in federal jurisdictions (Recent, 2015, p. 1559; Recording, 2017, p. 5), to which 
DHS belongs. Ye was indicted, convicted of aiding passport falsification, and appealed (Ye, 
2015, p. 398). The primary focus of Ye’s appeal was the inadequate translation provided 
by the Language Line interpreter, who was actually working from New York (Cal-Meyer 
& Coulthard, 2017, p. 2). 
Ye argued that the telephone interpreter, who had translated what had been de-
scribed as “copied” into “forged,” which was a highly loaded word that would have never 
been used (Petition, 2016, p. 34), was biased, and because this interpreter did not testify in 
court, Ye was unable to verify the accuracy of the translation provided by this telephone 
interpreter, which in the U.S. was also a violation of Ye’s confrontation right guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment, a right of a criminal defendant to cross-examine a person who 
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made a statement against the defendant. If what this person said is used as evidence to 
convict the defendant even if this person does not testify in court and undergo cross-exam-
ination, what this person said becomes hearsay, the use of which the U.S. Constitution pro-
hibits. After her appeal in the Ninth circuit failed, Ye appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
just as Taniguchi did, arguing that, by not having been given the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the telephone interpreter, Ye’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right had been vio-
lated, (Petition, pp. 25-36), which, however, was turned down by the Supreme Court.
8.1 Police Interpreter’s Hearsay Issue: 200-Year-Long Unresolved Issue
As to whether or not statements translated by a police interview interpreter who does not 
testify in court becomes hearsay is actually a long unresolved issue in US courts, as un-
like in the case of Taniguchi, the U.S. Supreme Court has continued to deny all the certio-
rari on this issue up to this very day (Brief for the United States, 2016, p. 6, p. 11; Tamura, 
2019, pp. 1-2). Also, unlike the U.K. which resolved the same issue in 1958 by deciding 
that interpreter-mediated police interview statements become all hearsay unless the in-
terpreter testifies in court (R v. Attard, 1958), in addition to introducing audio/video re-
cording of police interviews later in 1984 by the implementation of the PACE (Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act), U.S. courts have continuously ruled that police interview state-
ments translated by interpreters are not hearsay because an interpreter is a language con-
duit creating no extra layer of hearsay (e.g. U.S. v. Nazemian, 1991; Tamura, 2019, 2020). 
This situation remains unchanged despite continuing criticisms from concerned 
judges (e.g. U.S. v. Charles, 2013; Taylor v. State, 2016), human rights lawyers around the 
world (e.g. in Australia, Laster and Taylor, 1994), as well as linguists and interpreting 
studies researchers who have empirically demonstrated that interlingual translation is 
never a mechanical process, nothing like a conduit (Roy, 1989, p. 1, 2000, p. 101; Wadensjö, 
1998, p. 8; Berk-Seligson, 1990/2002, pp. 219-221; Angelelli, 2004, p. 19; Clifford, 2004, pp. 
90-96; Morris, 1995, p. 26, 1999, p. 6). Thus, the two-century-long debate continues to re-
main unresolved for police interpreters as well as for the users of their services, who also 
remain subjected to potentially inaccurate or biased translation which also remains im-
possible to verify as the law refuses to require police interpreters’ in-court testimony 
while being very slow in implementing complete digital recording of police interviews 
(Recent, 2015, p. 1559; Recording, 2017, p. 5), all of which result in continuous violation of 
non-English-speaking criminal defendants’ due process rights.
8.2 Incomplete Unity among Professionals’ Amici for Ye: Lukes’ 3rd Power Dimension
Just as in the case on Taniguchi, two amici briefs were submitted from the interpreting 
community: one was from court interpreters, but not from the NAJIT, the nationwide 
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organization, but just from one state only, the Massachusetts Association of Court 
Interpreters, though it was a 25-page-long brief, one page longer than the one by the 
NAJIT for Taniguchi; and the other one was from interpreting studies professors, but this 
too, unlike the 38-page long brief submitted for Taniguchi by eight professors in unison, 
was a 13-page-long brief prepared by only two of the above eight professors, namely, H. 
Mikkelson and B. S. Olsen of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
In addition, the opinions expressed in these two briefs were not quite in complete 
harmony. The former strongly and progressively contended that interpreter-mediated 
police interview statements are fundamentally all hearsay because: 1) an interpreter is not 
a language conduit that produces translations through an objective and precise process; 
but 2) rather, interpretation involves numerous subjective judgements; and thus 3) inter-
preters should be required to testify in court (Brief for the Massachusetts, 2016, p. 6, p. 7).
In contrast, the brief by Mikkelson and Olson (Brief of interpreting and translation 
professors, 2016) only stated: 1) a uniform case law in all U.S. courts was necessary (pp. 
4-7); 2) judicial community must understand that accurate translation never means me-
chanical word-switching but is a faithful rendition of what a speaker has “meant” (pp. 
7-11); and 3) clarity on testimony requirements are necessary as they will have a huge im-
pact not only on confidentiality and impartiality codes but also on interpreter training as 
an interpreter may have to remember “exact words of the defendant” as well as “her own 
words” (pp. 11-13). 
Unlike the two amici briefs for Taniguchi, which unanimously and unitedly voiced 
that interpreters and translators were two distinctly different professions, what can be 
detected from these two amici briefs for Ye is the absence of strong, completely united 
opinion among interpreting professionals regarding whether or not interpreter-mediated 
police interview statements are fundamentally hearsay requiring interpreters’ in-court 
testimony. The ambivalence is of course understandable as it is only natural for those 
who have received or given professional interpreter training to feel that all the rigorous 
practice is for the interpreters to specifically become able to reproduce in the target lan-
guage exactly the same meaning as what was expressed in the source language. In other 
words, interpreter training is given for the very purpose of enabling interpreters to over-
come the conventional hearsay obstacle by becoming a kind of trained “non-hearsay” 
messengers. For this reason, interlinguistic translation by a qualified interpreter, many 
interpreting professionals may feel, should be regarded as fundamentally different from 
a typical hearsay testimony, just as an incision with a surgical knife by a medical doctor 
is completely different from an ordinary person cutting another person with a knife.
That said, the progressive position taken by the Massachusetts Association of Court 
Interpreters is that with all the diligent, hard training and practice, interpreting is never a 
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mechanical process like a precision machine, but instead involves numerous experience-
based subjective judgments on the part of the interpreter every step along the way, and 
thus the interpreter is accountable for every translation decision made during the whole 
process, just as a medical surgeon is accountable for every step made during the surgery.
In short, the interpreting professionals’ ideology on this hearsay issue is not in per-
fect harmony, with many believing that qualified interpreters’ faithful interlingual trans-
lation can escape from creating an extra layer of hearsay, an ideology judicial community 
has always upheld. This is exactly where, this paper argues, Luke’s third power dimen-
sion may be at work: X exercises power to influence Y’s wishes and desires, so Y will 
wish for what may be against Y’s interest. Interpreters may have been influenced to share 
the judicial authority’s ideology even at the cost of being continuously deemed language 
conduit, which they detest.
8.3 The Court’s Silence on Interpreters’ Hearsay: Power Theories by Mason and Lukes
This 200-year-long interpreters’ hearsay issue, however, is even more complex than the 
above-mentioned professional interpreters’ ideological ambivalence, or more correctly, 
this paper argues, the issue is actually very simple. This paper has demonstrated how the 
Supreme Court can, if they so wish, very simply and singlehandedly decide complicated 
issues involving foreign language interpretation and translation. With all the technical 
discussions presented by the professionals, the Court, almost with a single stroke, decid-
ed that interpreters and translators are different, based simply on how dictionaries de-
fined the two terms.
This means that if the Supreme Court really so wishes, they can end this two-centu-
ry-long dispute today, by deciding that: 1) interpreter-mediated police interview state-
ments are hearsay and thus interpreters’ in-court testimonies are necessary; and 2) 
complete digital recording of police interviews is mandatory to help enable interpreters’ 
translation accuracy verification. Such decisions of course would open Pandora’s box as 
they will begin to eliminate unqualified, ad hoc, putatively bilingual police interpreters 
who are currently at work, the rampant practice of which is actually the real, fundamen-
tal social problem that awaits a solution, which, however, is defied by the continued ab-
sence of legislation like the Court Interpreters Act of 1978 or a decisive Supreme Court 
ruling (Berk-Seligson, 2009; González, Vásquez, & Mikkelson, 2012, pp. 443-530; Tamura, 
2019, 2020).
The only possible reason why this is not done, this paper argues, is a result of judi-
cial authority’s complex power execution on language interpreters that can be delineated 
by a combination of Mason’s (2015) “three types of power” and Lukes’ (2005) “three pow-
er dimensions.” As was mentioned in Section 2.1 above, Mason (2015) notes three types of 
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power constantly at play in interpreter-mediated discourse: 1) power relations between 
languages; 2) institutionally pre-determined power disparities; and 3) interpreters’ inter-
actional power advantage (pp. 314-316). 
In U.S. courts, criminal defendants requiring interpreters are, more often than not, 
speakers of minority languages associated with the socially low, uneducated linguistic 
and cultural group, to which interpreters themselves may also belong, thus possibly in-
viting low social respect. However, as the only bilingual person in an interpreter-mediat-
ed discourse, interpreters also have interactional power advantage, to prevent the abuse 
of which, it is not unlikely that the judicial authority tries to reinforce their rein using 
their “institutional power,” by reducing the status of language interpreters to a mere lan-
guage conduit, who only mechanically translates word-for-word, without interpreting the 
meaning, or intellectually thinking as someone with a professional knowledge would do.
However, if an interpreter becomes not a conduit but a trained professional with 
technical knowledge who is also accountable for the translation judgments and decisions 
made during a police interview and testifies in court as an interlingual interpretation ex-
pert on how to interpret the meaning of the SL and translate it into the TL, the judicial au-
thority’s exclusive prerogative to act as the only language interpreter in court, the interpreter 
of the language of law becomes threatened, and they may lose their control over the trial 
they preside in.
Furthermore, by repudiating the theory of non-hearsay by a language conduit, the trial 
court judges will lose the power to exercise their discretion, which permits police inter-
preters, no matter how unqualified, to pass as language conduits with their translation is-
sues untouched and unquestioned, so that the judges can focus on what they deem as 
more important issues, i.e., the conviction of the defendants who have otherwise been 
proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Only if and when there is a need, the judges can 
also use their discretion to raise a translation issue to influence the trial’s outcome.
If there is any truth in the above observations by the author, then this may be where 
Lukes’ second power dimension may be at work: X exercises power to pre-empt potential 
conflict that may arise between X and Y. The U.S. Supreme Court willingly and knowing-
ly continues not to make a decision on the hearsay issue of interpreter-mediated police 
interview statements so that the judicial authority can maintain its power and superiority 
over foreign language interpreters.
9. Conclusion
This paper conducted a comparative analysis of the two most recent U.S. Supreme Court 
cases involving foreign language interpreters, Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific, which was 
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adjudicated in 2012, and Aifang Ye v. U.S., the certiorari of which was denied on June 13, 
2016. By applying Ian Mason’s (2015) “three types of power” that come into play in inter-
preter-mediated discourse and Steven Lukes’ (2005) “three power dimensions,” the paper 
argued that the power disparity between the legal community and the interpreting com-
munity is not just a product of direct power exercise and coercion, but also a result of 
very complex power exertion, subtle and indirect but astute, by the judicial authority, 
successfully maintaining their superiority and prerogative to act as the only interpreter in 
a court of law, but also with a social cost such as continuous silent violation of non-Eng-
lish-speaking criminal defendants’ due process rights by the Court’s perpetual silence on 
the hearsay issue of interpreter-mediated police interviews.
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